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Abstract—Mobile Internet is becoming  the norm. With more 
personalized mobile devices in hand,  many  services choose to offer 
alternative,  usually more convenient, approaches to authenticat- 
ing and delivering the content between mobile users and service 
providers.  One main option  is  to use mobile  text service  (i.e., 
short messaging service). Such carrier-grade text service has been 
widely used  to assist versatile  mobile  services, including  social 
networking, banking, e-commerce, mobile-health, to name a few. 
Though the text service can be spoofed via certain Internet text 
service providers  which  cooperated with carriers,  such attacks 
haven well studied and defended by industry due to the efforts 
of research community. 
 
However,   as cellular network technology  independently ad- 
vances to the latest IP-based 4G LTE, we find that these mobile 
services are  somehow  exposed  to new threats  raised by this 
change,  particularly on 4G LTE  Text service  (via brand-new 
distributed Mobile-Initiated   Spoofed SMS attack which is  not 
available in legacy 2G/3G systems). The reason is that messaging 
service over  LTE  has  to shift from the a conventional  circuit- 
switched (CS) design  to the packet-switched  (PS) paradigm   as 
4G LTE supports PS only. Due to this fundamental  change, 4G 
LTE Text Service becomes inevitably  open and possible to access. 
However,  its shields  to messaging  integrity and user authenti- 
cation are  not in place,  while the legacy security  mechanisms 
deemed effective for 2G/3G text are in vain. As a consequence, 
such  weaknesses  can be exploited  to launch attacks against 
a targeted  individual,  a large  scale of mobile users  and even 
service providers,  from mobile  devices. Current defenses against 
Internet-Initiated Spoofed SMS attacks cannot work well against 
the unprecedented attack. Our study shows that 53 of 64 mobile 
services over  27 industries are vulnerable to at least one above 
threat, and some  are  even  prone to million-dollar  loss1 .  We 
validate  these proof-of-concept  attacks in one major US carrier 
which supports more than 100 million  users. We finally propose 
quick fixes  and recommended  remedies  and discuss security 
insights and lessons we have learnt. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Mobile service2  is gaining increasing popularity  in recent 
years, thanks to the rapid deployment of 3G/4G mobile net- 
works. For most of service providers, how to authenticate the 
content of messages exchanged between them and mobile  users 
and them at the reasonable  cost is very important. It shall 
satisfy three properties:  (1) content integrity: the data is not 
 
1 This work is done before August 15, 2015. All the threats and attacks 
described in the paper were validated before that. 
2 In this paper, we denote the mobile service to be the service is offered 
to the mobile phones. 
manipulated by the man in the middle; (2) origin authenticity: 
the data comes from the identified mobile user, and (3) non- 
repudiation of origin (accountability): the user cannot deny 
the origin of the data delivery. Among many options (e.g., 
message authentication  code, digital signature or bind service- 
level user session  with the secure communication  channel), 
the mobile text service3 is one popular solution to deliver 
the messages  and authenticate  the content  in practice.  Our 
studies show that this approach has been broadly  adopted by 
the diversified and famous  mobile service providers  includ- 
ing social networking  (Facebook, Twitter), grocery (Walmart, 
Target), airline (American Airline), bank (Chase, Citi), apparel 
(A&F), courier (Fedex, UPS), and name a few (more examples 
are given in Table I). 
 
The prosperity of the mobile text service based approach 
stems from three reasons. First, the text service well satisfies 
three desired properties. Each mobile  user has a physical  SIM 
card which store a cellular-specific  private key. The delivery 
of text message within carrier networks is confidentially and 
integrally protected by using the keys derived from the private 
key.  Though it has some  security issues (unauthorized   text 
messages sent by phone-side  malware  or spoofed text messages 
from Internet), thanks to efforts of research communities  and 
industry [10], [12], [24], [25], [31], [47], [48], [52], they are 
well addressed in the legacy 2G/3G networks, at least for top 
four largest  US carriers.  Second, the text service is one of 
the fundamental  services in mobile networks. It is available 
in almost every mobile phone. For service providers,  it is a 
convenient way to reach 6 billion mobile  users on the earth. 
 However, the 4G LTE network adopts a design paradigm 
shift for its text service. Different from 2G/3G, LTE is an all 
IP network. Its text service thus migrates from the traditional 
circuit-switched (CS) to the full packet-switched (PS) design. 
The natural question is: Given the dramatic  design change in 
the 4G text service, are the mobile services via text still safe 
as they are using 2G/3G text? 
 Unfortunately, our  study yields  the  negative   answer. 
For carriers, authentication/confidentiality/integrity   protec- 
tions, similar to those in circuit-switched  2G/3G text messages, 
are not always applied. The mobile device and mobile service 
providers have not been updated with new security components 
in accordance with the carrier infrastructure upgrade. The ser- 
 
3 In this work, we will interchangeably  use “text” and SMS (short message 
service) for a slight abuse of wording definition. 
vice providers seem to make security as second-class citizens
so that security semantics behind the usage interface may not
upgrade and ensured as the technology evolves. The service
interface for normal usage remains invariant but the underlying
security semantics changes as the technology evolves.
More specifically, our results show that 53 of 64 mobile
services (Table I) will suffer from new attacks, caused by
the change of underlying security semantics. Due to space
limit and similarity, we do not list all studied mobile services
including USPS, Dollar Tree, ZipCar, Weather.com, Dick’s
Sporting etc.. Only 9 are free from the three attacks. We
are able to (1) abuse the individual or large-scale Facebook4
account(s) to update their status, like pages or add friend,
(2) launch donation attack to transfer victims’ money and
(3) malicious spam lawsuit attack towards the brand-name
companies. Our assumed attack model is simple: the attacker
only uses commodity smartphones and have no control to
carrier networks. Note that we do not require to install any
malware on the victims’ phones. Though, to avoid the tracing
back issue, attacker may distribute a unprivileged application
(malware) to other mobile users and turn them into the Bots
to launch attacks. We evaluate these attacks in a responsive
and controlled manner (i.e., only attacking the participants of
this project) in one major US carrier which supports more than
100 million users.
These attacks are the result of security vulnerabilities from
the mobile device, carriers, mobile network standards and the
mobile service providers. For mobile devices, the phone-side
security mechanisms and permission control remain invariant
while text service technology evolved, as well as they are
easy to be bypast. For carriers, their security mechanisms
do not well recognize the fundamental differences between
2G/3G and 4G text messages. 4G users can freely specify
the originating address of the text message being sent which
it is not allowed in 2G/3G by the protocol design. For
mobile network standards (3GPP and 3GPP25), they have a
conflict that which the security mechanisms should be used for
sending/receiving text message in 4G LTE. For mobile service
providers, their loose service enrollment and weak (or even
no) runtime authentication mechanisms make them vulnerable
to the new attacks launched from 4G LTE mobile devices. We
propose solutions to these vulnerabilities, and are working with
all parties involved for the fix.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. §II intro-
duces the content authentication mechanisms used by mobile
services, and how they cooperate with the legacy 2G/3G text
service, and reviews the early security threats and defenses. §III
describes the 4G text service, potential security vulnerabilities,
attack model and methodology. §IV uses Facebook as a case
study to illustrate the vulnerabilities exposed to mobile service
users. §V presents the way to scale the individual Facebook
attack to large-scale attack. §VI conducts a medium-scale
study on mobile services, presents their security loopholes in
common, and what possible attacks may be launched them.
§VII proposes the solutions, §VIII describes the related work
4This attack is also applied to Twitter, as well.
53GPP stipulates the standards of GSM, GPRS, WCDMA and UMTS
(the representative US carriers are AT&T and T-Mobile), while 3GPP2 defines
CDMAOne, CDMA200, EV-DO standards (the representative US carriers are
Verizon and Sprint).
and §IX concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Content Authentication in Mobile Services
For mobile services, it is a critical function to authenticate
the content of messages exchanged between mobile users
and mobile service providers (e.g. social networking, banking
transfer, donating). They include sensitive information, (user
identity, money being transferred, etc.), and should be pro-
tected at runtime to guarantee three properties: (1) content
integrity: the data is not manipulated by the man in the middle;
(2) origin authenticity: the data comes from the identified
mobile user, and (3) non-repudiation of origin (accountability):
the user cannot deny the origin of the data delivery.
In practice, there are three popular approaches to achieve
the three goals. In the first approach, each delivered message is
associated with a self-certifying fingerprints to enforce the se-
curity. This fingerprints can be either based on the lightweight
shared secret between user and server (e.g. Message Au-
thentication Code or MAC), or the heavyweight asymmetric
public/private keys distributed to suer and server (e.g. digital
signature). This approach can guarantee the integrity and
authenticity of the message. However, the lightweight shared-
secret cannot provide strong guarantee of non-repudiation
(both users and service providers share the same secret), while
the heavyweight asymmetric cryptography requires both users
and service servers to have private keys issued by authorized
CA, which is proven to be not scalable.
In the second approach, the content identity is bound
to the communication channel between mobile user and
service provider. For example, many mobile services bind
username/password with the SSL/TLS connection between
user and server. If the verification of username/password
succeeds, the service server will generate a security token (e.g.
HTTP cookies) associated with SSL/TLS connection between
user and server. Similar to the first approach, the binding
approach also guarantees the integrity of the messages. But
the authenticity of the messages is usually unidirectional.
That is, by SLL/TLS design, the messages from servers are
always guaranteed with authenticity. But the authenticity of
the messages from the user relies on the security token plus
SSL/TLS connection context, which cannot provide strong
non-repudiation property (users do not have unique private
keys issued by authorized CA).
The third approach is to rely on the text service in
mobile network. They take advantage of readily deployed
mobile text service security to guarantee above properties in
a cost-effective way. In fact, the mobile text service is more
secure than people expected. We consider the scenario that
the mobile service provider communicates with its users by
using a mobile phone to send/receive text messages within the
same carrier network. Other scenarios will be discussed later.
Before mobile phone sends/receivs texts, it has to perform the
registration procedure towards mobile network by using the
private key (similar to the private certificate issued by CA,
but it is cellular specific) stored in the SIM card (a physical
artifact). During registration procedure, the unique integrity
and confidentiality keys are derived from the private key to
encrypt/decrypt the control-plane signaling messages in mobile
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No. Provider Industry Short
Code
Enrollment Service Operations via Text M A W T Threats
1 Walmart Grocery 63257 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
10 CVS Pharmacy Pharmacy 35437 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
18 Costco Grocery 71034 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
21 JP Morgan Chase Bank 24273 4-Step-AuthCode Req-Resp Query balance, history, etc. No No Yes No No
23 Bank of America Bank 692632 4-Step-Simple Req-Resp Query balance, history, etc. No No Yes No No
28 Citi Bank Bank 692484 4-Step-AuthCode Req-Resp Query balance, history, etc. No No Yes No No
30 Wells Fargo Bank 93557 Four-Step Req-Resp Query balance, history, Yes No Yes No No
transfer money and etc.
33 HomeDepot Retailing 38688 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No Yes No Spam lawsuit
36 Target Baby Grocery 827438 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No Yes No Spam lawsuit
36 Target Store Grocery 827438 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No Yes No Spam lawsuit
41 State Farm Insurance 78836 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Text alerts No No No No No∗
47 UPS Courier 69877 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Order status No No Yes No Spam lawsuit
50 Lowes Retailing 656937 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
65 Fedex Courier 48773 One-step Sub-Notif Order status No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
70 American Airline Airline 35922 One-step Sub-Notif Query Flight status No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
84 Safeway Grocery 25374 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No No No∗
88 American Express Bank 692639 4-Step-Simple Req-Resp Query balance, history, etc. No No Yes No No
104 TimeWarner Cable ISP 789789 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
105 Macy Store 62442 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
134 Staple Grocery 555444 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
138 US Bank Bank 872265 Two-Step Req-Resp Query balance, history, etc. No No Yes No No
157 KOHL’s Grocery 56457 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
161 SouthWest Airline Airline 72743 One-step Sub-Notif Flight status update No No Yes No Spam lawsuit
187 Starbucks Retailing 22122 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
194 Office Depot Grocery 33768 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No Yes No Spam lawsuit
221 Marriot Hotel 58682 One-step Sub-Notif Confirmation No No Yes No No
242 Facebook Social
Networks
32665 4-Step-AuthCode Req-Resp,
Sub-Notif
Update status, add friends,
like pages, (un)subscribe, etc.
No No Yes No Account abuse
245 Toys R US Toy 78697 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
250 JC Penny Store 527365 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
260 Bed Bath Beyond Grocery 239663 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
303 Discover Bank 347268 Two-Step Req-Resp Sub-Notif, Alert No No Yes No No
541 Levis Apparel 84483 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
648 Abercrombie &
Fitch
Apparel 231892 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
648 Abercrombie kids Apparel 34824 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
648 Hollister Co Apparel 743722 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
NA Twitter Social
Networks
40404 4-Step-AuthCode Req-Resp,
Sub-Notif
Update status/profile, block,
send text,(un)follow, etc.
No No Yes No Account abuse
NA Domino Pizza Fast Food 366466 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No Yes No Spam lawsuit
NA Paypal ePayment 729725 4-Step-AuthCode Req-Resp Query balance, history, etc. No No Yes No No
NA Papa John FastFood 47272 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
NA Charlotte Russe Apparel 78953 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
NA Payless Shoes Apparel 747474 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
NA Southern Class Apparel 313131 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No Yes No Spam lawsuit
Clothing
NA ULTA Beauty Cosmetic 80565 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
NA AMC Theaters Entertainment 242424 One-step Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
NA Kay Jewelers Jewelry 553935 4-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
NA NBC NEWS Media 67622 One-step Sub-Notif News update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
NA NEWS 9 Media 79640 One-step Sub-Notif News update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
NA TMZ Store Media 52966 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif News update No No Yes No Spam lawsuit
NA WISH TV Media 36729 One-step Sub-Notif News/Weather update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
NA Cabelas Sport 247365 3-Step-Simple Sub-Notif Special offer, flyer, update No No No Yes Spam lawsuit
NA Red Cross HumanAid 90999 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA Arvada Council Art 20222 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA PhoenixArtMuseum Art 20222 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA American Library
Association
Education 41518 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA Claflin Univ. Education 52000 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA Robert Morris Univ. Education 501501 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA In-N-Out Burger FastFood 20222 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA Greater Boston
Food Bank
FoodAid 20222 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA Zindagi Trust FoodAid 80088 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA WorldFoodProgram FoodAid 50555 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA Los Angeles Po-
lice Foundation
Government 20222 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA Aid for Aids Medical 41010 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA American Cancer
Society
Medical 41518 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
NA National Wildlife
Federation
Nature 25383 Always on Req-Resp Donation Yes Weak No Noa Donation
Total 64 27 6 2 53/64
Table I. SUMMARY OF 64 MOBILE SERVICES WITH TEXT ENABLED. NO. IS SHORT FOR FORTUNE 500 RANKING [5] (N/A: NON-PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS OR NOT IN TOP 1000 LARGEST COMPANIES). THE MAWT COLUMNS ARE M: MONEY INVOLVEMENT, A: RUNTIME AUTHENTICATION, W:
ENROLLMENT VIA WEB, T: ENROLLMENT VIA TEXT. NOTE THAT DIFFERENT MOBILE SERVICES MAY SHARE THE SAME SHORT CODE. THE TEXT MESSAGE
IS DISPATCHED ACCORDINGLY BY THE TEXT CONTENT.
aThe mobile service is automatically enrolled by carriers. 3
networks. Since text message is delivered over control-plane, it
is confidentially and integrally protected by design. Thus, the
message integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation properties
are satisfied. Compared with the traditional approaches, the
text-based approach does not require extra private certificate
to support strong non-repudiation property since each mobile
user has a physical SIM card store a cellular-specific private
key.
Beside, text service is ubiquitous to every mobile phone,
making it readily deployable for mobile services without extra
infrastructure or software deployment. Those characteristics
make it as a popular mechanism to deliver and authenticate
the messages exchanged between mobile users and service
providers (as shown in Table I). Moreover, it also help mo-
bile service providers to better verify user identifier (prevent
malicious users to lots of fake accounts) than other alternatives
(e.g., verify by email or voice call). Many mobile service
providers, e.g., WhatsApp, Viber, eBuddy XMS, Tango, Voypi,
Naver LINE, use text message to verify user. Although it still
has some security issues (e.g., spoofed text), they are known
to the academia and carriers, and well addressed (at least in
top largest four US carriers). Due to its popularity and broad
impact, we next introduce how mobile service is cooperated
with 2G/3G text services.
B. Mobile Service via 2G/3G Text Service
We first review how mobile services are achieved via
2G/3G text service, and then highlight the new changes with
4G message service in next section. Figure 1 shows messaging
service in 2G/3G. In 2G/3G network, the text message is
exchanged in the circuit-switched (CS) domain which is man-
dated by Mobile Switching Center (MSC). The text message
is treated as a cellular signaling message, rather than normal
data. The sender encapsulates the text message in a uplink
transport signaling message, and delivers it to the MSC . The
MSC decapsulates the message, and relays the text message
to the Short Message Service (SMS) servers. The SMS server
provides the store-and-forward feature, and tries to forward
the message to the receiver through the circuit-switched path.
Once the message is successfully delivered, the SMSC would
acknowledge to the sender with a delivery report via the
signaling channel.
Most mobile services through 2G/3G text service follow
similar reference models for deployment, as shown in Figure 1.
Most mobile service providers communicate with mobile users
with unique short codes (e.g. 32655 for Facebook), which are
audited and granted by Common Short Code Administration
(CSCA) in US. More specifically, it works as follows. When
mobile user sends a text message to a short code, the text
message would then be forwarded by carriers to the authorized
aggregators, which would further relay the message to the
service provider. Note that the aggregators participating in
the short code services have to be audited and monitored
by CSCA and CITA (Cellular Telecommunications Industry
Association). The service provider would then provide the
corresponding service to user (e.g. subscribe, money transfer),
and may reply the user with a text message.
Threats and Defenses. The security of 2G/3G text service
is not without problems. The providers may suffer from
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Figure 1. 2G/3G messaging service architecture, and mobile service providers
with short code services.
unauthorized text delivery from phone-side malware [24], [25]
and spoofed message [52] from Internet. Note that the spoofed
message from mobile devices is forbidden in 2G/3G since there
is no originating address header field for the text message being
sent by SMS protocol design. More details will be given in §IV
Fortunately, most of these attacks towards mobile service
providers have been effectively mitigated after years of active
operations. First, for the phone-side malware, Android OS will
automatically prompt users and ask for their confirmations
while any application tries to send text messages to the short
codes of mobile service providers. The details will be elabo-
rated in §IV. Second, for the spoofed message from Internet (it
is more likely done through the customers of the aggregators),
more and more aggregators disallow their customers/users to
send texts using phone numbers which do not belong to them
(e.g., twilio, no spoofing [17]). Besides, the easiest way for
mobile service providers is to explicitly ask their aggregators
only forward the text messages from carrier networks. Note
that we do not consider the scenario that malicious carriers
compromise users’ text messages here since it is not a very
common case in practice.
III. NEW SECURITY ISSUES WHEN TEXT SERVICE TURNS
FROM 2G/3G CS INTO 4G PS
A. Text Service over PS Primer
Similar to the counterparts in 2G/3G, the text services
in 4G LTE follow the similar reference model. The major
difference comes from the underlying network infrastructure
upgrade in 4G. Different from 2G/3G, 4G LTE is an IP-
based mobile network. Its text service inevitably embraces
the full packet-switched (PS) design. As shown in Figure 2,
the text messages are no longer delivered through the circuit-
switched domain. Instead, the messages are forwarded to the
SMS gateways via 4G PS gateways, IMS (IP Multimedia
Subsystem) and IP-SMS GW (IP-to-SMS Gateway) through
SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) [40]. The underlying network
technology evolves largely, however, most service providers do
not update their mobile service in accordance with the 4G text
service upgrade. However, we find that such defenses fail to
fully protect mobile services. As we will show next, potential
vulnerabilities are exposed to mobile services over 4G text
service.
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B. Potential Vulnerabilities
Ultimately, text and data operate services in the same,
connection-less IP network. However, this paradigm shift is
double-edged, exposing mobile users, carrier and mobile ser-
vice providers to unanticipated vulnerabilities.
In this paper, we look into three security aspects.
1) How do the phone-side security mechanisms accom-
modate the significant change in mobile networks?
Are they still working fine or can be bypast by the
attackers to launch a novel attack?
2) Are carriers ready to launch the text service over PS?
Does the current operational network infrastructure
well protect both mobile service providers and users
from malicious attacks? Or, on the contrary, it help
attackers to broaden the damages of attacks in the
real world?
3) Does there exits any security loopholes of current ser-
vice enrollment, use scenario or runtime authentica-
tion mechanisms which can be exploited by attackers
in 4G LTE networks? Are the current mobile services
still well protected as they cooperate with the 2G/3G
text service?
Our study covers three major components of mobile ser-
vices via text: mobile devices, carrier networks, and service
providers. In the following sections, we disclose how the
currently employed or newly developed mechanisms fail to
harden mobile services against attacks and how they are
exploited to abuse Facebook account(s) (§IV and §
refsect:large-scale), donation attack (§VI) and spam lawsuit
attack (§VI).
C. Attack Model and Methodology
The attacker is a mobile user, whereas the victims can
be the mobile service providers or other mobile users. The
adversary mainly uses a commodity smartphone which does
not have the rooted privilege to launch attacks. (S)he has
no remote access, at least no privileged access to the victim
phones. In all our attacks, we do not require any malware
to be installed on the victims’ phones. However, to avoid the
tracking issue, attacker may distribute an unprivileged Android
application (malware) to other mobile users and turn them into
the helpers to launch attacks. Note that this application does
not require any the permission to send or receive text messages.
Besides, in all cases, we assume that the attacker has no control
to the carrier network.
To validate vulnerabilities and attacks, we conduct exper-
iments in two top-tier US carriers denoted as OP-I and OP-
II, for the privacy concern. They together cover almost 50%
of market share [7]. We use two Android phone models that
support SMS over IMS domain: Samsung Galaxy S5 and
LG G3, running Android 4.4.4 and 4.4.2, respectively. Note
that only a few recent models support this feature, because it
requires phone hardware and software upgrades. We focus on
the Android OS but we believe that the identified issues are
applicable to any other OS.
We bear in mind that some feasibility tests and attack
evaluations might be detrimental to users, operators or mobile
service providers. Therefore, we conduct this study in a re-
sponsible manner through two measures. First, we use only our
own phones as the victims. Second, we purchase unlimited text
plans for all tested phones. We seek to disclose new security
vulnerabilities brought by SMS over IMS and effective attacks,
but not to aggravate the damages. We do not claim that the
attacks are not the most powerful ones to make damage or
there exists no ways to detect them.
IV. CASE STUDY: ABUSING A FACEBOOK
ACCOUNT WITHOUT PASSWORD
In this section, we use Facebook as a case study to illustrate
the vulnerabilities exposed to mobile service customers using
SMS. We report a contactless attack where an adversary can
remotely manipulate a victim’s Facebook account without
knowing his password. The attacker can update the victim’s
status, like a page/status, add friends, subscribe/follow/poke
someone, on the victim’s behalf without his/her consent. More
threatening, the attack itself is not intricate. It is ready to
launch by any individual with a commodity phone or device6
which supports SMS service in 4G LTE networks. Note that
our approach is also applied to Twitter as well. Due to space,
we only present Facebook as a case study.
We find out that the vulnerabilities are rooted in multi-
fold interactions among the service provider (here, Facebook),
mobile device, carrier networks and even cellular standard
organization (3GPP2). The service providers (e.g., Facebook)
leverages the mobile service (here, SMS) and mobile devices
to offer convenient and friendly user experience. It counts
on user authentication offered in cellular networks to protect
their own service access. It thus takes authenticate-once-use-
forever scheme where it merely authenticates users once, but
allow them to access services forever. However, it is not
secure while both carriers and mobile devices do not offer the
guaranteed guard any more with their technical upgrade and
evolution. In this case, when the cellular network technology is
moving into 4G LTE, SMS is migrated from the conventional
CS domain to the PS domain. Its evolution unfortunately
exposes SMS to an open attack interface and thus allows a
contactless impersonation. More surprisingly, we disclose that
this problem is not caused by imprudent implementation bugs,
but rooted in the problematic design regulated by the standard
organization. The standard aims to offer flexibility (several
6It can be a tablet or a computer with cellular modem.
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options) to carriers to develop a better SMS service but some
options are inherently lacking sufficient protection as they did
before. This change eventually makes the whole chain collapse.
A. Security Loopholes
1) Facebook, authenticate-once-use-forever: The first
vulnerability lies in Facebook’s authentication scheme:
Authenticate-Once-Use-Forever. In fact, in order to secure
user’s account (see the official page in Figure 3), Facebook
encourages and even allures their customers to bind their
accounts with their mobile phone numbers. The reminder of
registering a phone number keeps prompting if the users does
not yet. Consequently, a large number of users, especially
technology-unsavvy ones, have done this. This seems solid
for the following reasons. First, mobile phones are more
personal devices and are almost carried by people all the time.
This offers a always-online experience to Facebook accounts.
You can receive friends’ latest status updates or messages
through text. Second, cellular networks adopt SIM-card-based
user authentication, which is typically more secure than the
password protection. A mobile phone number is associated
with an authenticated user unless the SIM card is hijacked
(not a commonplace scenario though possible [8]).
To register a phone number, Facebook requires 4-step pro-
cedures as illustrated in Figure 4. The user first sends a request
to “Add a Phone” after (s)he logins website. Afterwards, the
user texts the letter “F” to 32665 (FBOOK) from his/her phone
and receives a one-time confirmation code issued by Facebook.
Finally, the user enters the confirmation code received at the
previous “Add a phone” webpage. By this way, Facebook
builds a secure association between a mobile phone number
and a Facebook account. This is ensured three cascading
authenticated channels. The first is the session between a
Facebook account and Facebook, which has been authenticated
by the user password (marked in grey). The second is the SMS
channel between a phone number and Facebook (via cellular
network), guaranteed by SIM-card-based user authentication
in cellular network (in a red box). The third is the one-time
random code which stays valid in a limited time window (say,
several minutes). Therefore, the code should be known only
to the one who owns the phone number, not a third-party.
As a matter of fact, such one-time two-way authentication via
text has been widely used in other services, such as banking,
e-commence, instant messaging, website registration, etc., to
verify the user identifiers.
The vulnerability is that the above authentication is one-
time only. Afterwards, it does not run any extra authentication
to ensure that the operation command comes from this regis-
tered phone number. The above registration by default turns
on Facebook Text Service [4], which allows mobile users to
update his status, add a friend, poke someone, like a page to
name a few, through sending command messages to 32665
(FBOOK), e.g., LIKE Facebook stories, ADD a Friend’s email
address or phone number. We conduct a 28-day experiment to
perform six major functions provided by Facebook text service
after the initial registration. We find that all functions can be
performed without using any password or extra mechanism in
the whole test cycle.
Such one-time message authentication fundamentally bal-
ances between security and usability. Despite seemingly sim-
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Figure 4. Procedure to add a phone and enable Facebook Text service.
plistic, one-time message To invoke the password-based mes-
saging authentication, the user should manually type in the
message. Clearly, it is practically inconvenient to apply com-
plex authentication/encryption operations upon each message,
too difficult for manual input. Therefore, most applications
(like Facebook) decide to fully trust the received messages at
runtime, as well as the binding of the phone number, assuming
that the mobile OS and the cellular infrastructure have ensured
the authenticity of the message.
2) Conflicts between Cellular Standards, Negotiable Se-
curity Mechanisms: For cellular networks, there exists two
international telecommunication organizations: 3GPP funded
by ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute)
and 3GPP2 funded by Qualcomm. They stipulate their own
radio access technologies and core networks standards. General
speaking, compared with complex cellular-specific protocols in
3GPP, 3PP2 is more open to offer carriers options (e.g., how
to communicate with IMS server) in operations or utilize the
techniques (e.g., Mobile IP) have been broadly used in Internet.
We notice that there exists some differences/conflicts between
two cellular standards might lead to security loopholes in 4G
LTE.
Security mechanisms7 are negotiable in 3GPP2 but not in
3GPP. 3GPP2 standard [21] offer five security options (TLS,
DIGEST [40], IPSec-IKE, IPSec-MAIN, IPSec-3GPP) to car-
riers to determine how secure their 4G users to communicate
with the IMS servers, whereas 3GPP leaves carriers no choices
but IPSec-3GPP to establish secure communication between
mobile users and IMS servers. While DIGEST is chosen
(i.e., authenticate the mobile user while the SIP registration
procedure is conducted towards IMS server), there is no
network-layer or transport-layer security protection for the
communication between mobile users and the IMS servers.
It relies the underlying cellular-specific security mechanisms
(e.g., confidentiality and integrity protection for the data de-
livered between mobile devices and base stations.
Our experiment results show that OP-I (3GPP2 carrier)
adopts DIGEST in its 4G LTE networks as shown in Figure 5,
whereas OP-II (3GPP2) uses IPSec-3GPP to encrypt/decrypt
the SIP messages. We use Wireshark to capture packets
delivered between mobile device and carrier networks. The
mobile deceive receives a SIP 401 Unauthorized after
7We focus on IMS security framework in this paper.
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Figure 3. Facebook asks users to add their mobile phone numbers to secure their accounts.
Status: 401 unauthorized
Authentication by DIGEST No encryption is enabled!!
Figure 5. Wireshark trace: A US major carrier adopts DIGEST as the main security mechanism in its 4G LTE network
it sends SIP REGISTER to the IMS server. In the SIP 401
Unauthorized message, the IMS server specify the method
of user authentication to be DIGEST and provide parameters
required (e.g., challenge, algorithm, nonce). The mobile device
computes the answer to auth challenge and submits a new
SIP REGISTER to the IMS server. Afterward, the mobile
device receives a unencrypted SIP 200 OK from the IMS
server. Note that this response and all messages after it shall be
encrypted if IPSec is enabled (the keys for IPSec are computed
during the digest authentication by cellular standards). It shows
that OP-I deploys DIGEST instead of IPSec family into its 4G
LTE networks.
Carrier might trust that the underlying security mechanisms
have provide sufficient protection and the disabling of IPSec
can improve the data delivery performance to some extent.
Nevertheless, it can be exploited to analyze the communication
between mobile users and IMS servers to devise attacks. We
further learn how to compose a valid SIP MESSAGE carries
a SMS being sent and the way to send it to the proper IMS
server. More details are given in Appendix A and B.
3) Differences between Cellular Systems, Not Ready for
Originating Address Newly Introduced: To prevent malicious
users from sending text with unauthorized phone number (i.e.,
spoofed text), cellular standards does not allow users to fill
sender’s phone number into the text being sent by its design of
mobile text protocols (SM-TL [20]). There is no “originating
address” header in the text message being sent in the legacy
2G and 3G systems. Nevertheless, the design principle is no
longer available in the 4G LTE standards.
While a 4G user sends SMS, he/she need to specify the
sender phone number into the From header of SIP MESSAGE
which carries the SMS towards the IMS server as shown in
Figure 6. We believe that it is a new threat/challenge to carriers
since they do not need to concern the spoofed SMS from
mobile devices in legacy systems. Once 4G LTE carriers do
not notice it or deploy the necessary security mechanism (i.e.,
verify sender identifier in IMS server), it will be exploited to
launch a new device-based spoofed SMS attack which differs
from internet-based one disclosed in the early researches.
Unfortunately, our experiment results confirm this suspi-
MESSAGE tel:XXX2831613;phone-context=xxxx.com SIP/2.0
Max-Forwards: 70
Route: <sip:[2001:xxxx:xxxx:fe03:fa:104::1a]:5060;lr>
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP [2600:xxxx:xxxx:f517:148c:d7ab:5a31:d2b3]:5060;branch=z9hG4bK000677ad-6e30b
CSeq: 1 MESSAGE
From: <sip:+1XXX8232501@xxxx.com>;tag=00067767-02208f88
To: <tel:XXX2831613;phone-context=xxxx.com>
Allow: INVITE,BYE,CANCEL,ACK,PRACK,UPDATE,INFO,REFER,NOTIFY,MESSAGE,OPTIONS
P-Preferred-Identity: <sip:+1XXX8232501@xxxx.com>
P-Access-Network-Info: 3GPP-E-UTRAN-FDD;utran-cell-id-3gpp=31148029065379d0c
Request-Disposition: no-fork
User-Agent: LG-IMS-client/3.3.0 VSXXX 4G
Content-Type: application/vnd.3gpp2.sms
Call-ID: 00067745-44a06aad@2600:xxxx:xxxx:f517:148c:d7ab:5a31:d2b3
Content-Length: 29
Sender’s phone number
Recipient's phone number
Figure 6. 4G LTE users are allowed to specify their phone numbers in
From header in the SIP MESSAGE carried the SMS being sent while they
communicate with IMS servers.
cion in OP-I. We conduct an experiment to identify what kinds
of phone numbers an be spoofed. It works as follows. We
prepare a OP-I mobile device whose phone number is XXX-
YYY-2501, compose SIP MESSAGE carries SMS message
by fill in the originating address to the phone number being
verified and destination address to XXX-YYY-2501, and sent
it the IMS server based on the approaches introduced in
Appendix A and B. If our OP-I mobile device receives a
SMS message comes from the phone number being verified, it
means that the sender’s phone number might be spoofable. We
further construct the same SIP MESSAGE but use different
destination address (e.g., another mobile phone number of OP-
I or distinct carriers), send it out and examine if there exists
any restriction to receive such spoofed SMS.
We verify the sender and recipient phone numbers belong
to the top four largest US carriers including OP-I and OP-
II. We find that only mobile phone number belongs to OP-I is
spoofable in OP-I 4G LTE networks. It shows that OP-I indeed
deployed the security check for the originating address newly
added to 4G LTE. However, it is still far away the satisfaction.
Second, there is no sign of restriction for users to receive the
spoofed SMS sent from OP-I.
B. Proof-of-Concept Attack
We devise a proof-of-concept attack to show how attacker
manipulate another user’s Facebook account though Facebook
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(a) Update status (b) Add “ResearchTwo” as friend (c) Like LakersNation (d) Activity logs of victim
Figure 7. Launch update-status, add-a-friend and like-a-page Facebook attacks towards ResearchOne from ResearchTwo who is using the phone number 2501
(last four digits).
Text Service to update status, add a friend and like a page
without his/her permission. We called them as update-status,
like-a-page and add-a-friend attacks afterwards. Note that no
malware is required to be installed on the victim’s mobile
phone, computer or any device can access the Facebook
service.
1) Design: Clearly, the above loopholes can be exploited
by attackers to proceed all functions of Facebook Text Service
on behalf of victim. It works as follows. The adversary
constructs the SIP MESSAGE carries SMS message based on
the procedure in Appendix A with three modifications. First,
victim’s phone number is used as the originating address in all
related SIP headers. Second, “32665” (i.e., FBOOK) is used
for recipient phone number in both SIP headers and SMS
headers. Third, we fill the specific commands (e.g., update
status: “Hi...”, add a friend: “Add Bob”, like a page: “Like
Lakers Nation”) into SMS content (user data shown in
Figure 13) for Facebook Text Service. Then, attacker sends
the SIP MESSAGE to the IMS server.
2) Prototype and Evaluation: We implement the Hack-
Facebook, an Android application which only requires Internet
permission to communicate with the IMS server, as shown in
Figure 7(a). It can be launched on the adversary’s own mobile
device or Bots on Botnet (i.e., we can distribute HackFacebook
as malware8 to other mobile devices). To accommodate the
various mobile devices with different Android versions (from
2.3.3 to 5.1.1), we are only using the socket APIs which are
supported in all Android releases.
To evaluate the HackFacebook, we further create two Face-
book accounts (ResearchOne and ResearchTwo9) and associate
two OP-I mobile phone numbers with them (434710 is for
ResearchOne, 2501 for ResearchTwo). We run HackFacebook
on the mobile device using phone number 2501 to launch
update-status, add-a-friend and like-a-page attacks towards
the victim ResearchOne who is using phone number 4347.
Figure 7 illustrates how those attacks are launched through
8For the malware version, the UI components shall be hidden and provide
users with the certain network services, e.g., query the standard time. However,
we don’t discuss how to implement the malware version and prevent users
from recognizing it since it is not the main focus of this work.
9Note that the naming of FB accounts does not present any information
of authors.
10For privacy concern, we only show the last four digits of the mobile
phone number here.
HackFacebook and the snapshot of activity logs of victims.
It shows that the adversary can freely update status, add a
friend (adds ResearchTwo as friend) or like a page (likes
LakersNation) on behalf of victim without his/her permission.
3) Variant, still works fine even sender spoofing of SMS is
not allowed: People may argue that our attack is devised on
the fact that carriers do not perform strict security check for
the originating address of SMS messages being sent. Once the
security check is deployed, all issues we present above will be
completely addressed. We are eager to clarify it here. As what
we described earlier, the HackFacebook can be distributed as
a malware and infects almost of all mobile devices to send
SMS commands to Facebook Text Service since it does not
require the root privilege. However, next question will be
“What is the difference between HackFacebook and malware-
based text attacks if sender spoofing is forbidden in carrier
network”? There are uncounted malware developed to send
SMS messages in background without user’s consent. Is there
anything new? We would like to answer this question in the
following section.
C. What’s difference between current attack and early SMS
attacks?
We next highlight the differences between our attack mod-
els with previous two major SMS attacks.
Phone-side malware text attacks In recent years, the security
research communities and public media [1], [2], [11], [55] have
reported many malware, e.g., AnserverBot, HippoSMS, that
send SMS messages to specific phone numbers in background.
They do not intend to fake the SMS sender phone number
but aim to launch the premium-rate SMS charging attack
or leaking victim’s personal information (e.g., location), to
name a few. Most of them do not require the root privilege
but SMS SEND permission, and can infect significant mobile
devices (e.g., 30,000 [1]). However, benefit from Google’s
research efforts, Android users are not threatened by the
malware-based attacks towards mobile services, e.g., Facebook
Text Service. It works as follows. While any Android applica-
tion tries to send a SMS message to specific phone numbers or
short codes (e.g., 32665, FBOOK), user will get a confirmation
dialog popup which is controlled by Android OS as shown in
Figure 8. Before user confirms it, no SMS message will be
sent, even the SMS sending application has been granted with
8
Figure 8. Android’s security check on recipient’s phone number
SMS SEND permission. It effectively reduces the damages of
the early phone-side malware text attacks.
Different from the early phone-based malware text attacks,
our attack can easily bypass the current Android’s security
check on recipient phone number. The root cause is that the
security check is merely associated with Android text send-
ing APIs (e.g., SmsManager.sendTextMessage). Once
attacker is capable of delivering text messages via other ap-
proaches (e.g., by UDP socket APIs), the security mechanism
is no longer effective.
Network-based spoofed text attacks There are several online
text spoofing sources [13]–[15] providing their customers to
send the spoofed text messages to any recipient. However,
there are two main drawbacks to launch the network-based
spoofed text attacks towards mobile services in practice. First,
most of mobile service providers communicate with the mobile
users by the unique short codes (e.g., 32665, more examples
will be given in §VI). Only the authenticated aggregators can
deliver text messages to the short code owners (i.e., mobile
service providers here). It is not difficult for them to identify
whether the text messages for mobile service providers are
sent by wireless carriers or other sources (e.g., the customers
of aggregators or content providers as shown in Figure 2), and
further block all text messages sent by the non-carriers sources.
Second, attackers are very easy to be traced back since those
online text service providers including text spoofing websites
do not provide the free text delivery service. They require
users to setup the accounts and pay for the text delivery. From
technical perspective, we do believe that the attackers might
launch the spoofed text attacks towards mobile services and
probably achieve the similar effects as our approach. However,
it is difficult for them hide themselves due to those pre-
established user accounts and the payment history.
Our attack differs from the network-based spoofed text
attacks. First, the spoofed text messages are sent to mobile
service providers through the legitimate wireless carriers and
aggregators. The aggreagtors cannot protect the mobile service
providers by blocking all text messages sent by non-carrier
sources. Second, our approach does not require attackers to
subscribe any voice/data/messaging plan from carriers or setup
any account before launching attacks. Since HackFacebook can
be distributed as a malware and infect the mobile devices to
send the spoofed text, as well as bypass the security check
mechanism deployed at mobile devices. The dual characteris-
tics make the adversaries hard to be captured or detected. Note
that we do not claim that there is absolutely no way to discover
the attackers. However, our approach provides the attackers
with the better camouflage than network-based attacks.
D. Lessons Learnt
There are four lessons we learnt. First, the runtime au-
thentication is essential to the mobile service providers which
provides the non-query-only services (e.g., update status, like
page, etc). Two, the security is not negotiable regardless of
any concerns. Mobile network standards should not offer an
insecure communication mechanism (i.e., disable TLS/IPSec)
to carriers. Third, the phone-side security mechanisms pro-
vided by OS (Android) cannot always capture the changes of
underlying networking technology. We do need a more generic
and flexible security framework for mobile device and carrier
networks. Fourth, carriers should not be too rush to launch
a service, especially for ones have incompatible issues with
the early deployment, and create new security loopholes (e.g.,
incomplete security check on the sender identifier of 4G text
message).
V. LARGE-SCALE ATTACK TOWARDS FACEBOOK USERS
In this section, we introduce how to scale the individual
Facebook attack to large-scale attacks. We devise two novel
attacks: (1) Free Million(s) Facebook Likes and (2) Large-
Scale User Privacy Leakage, implement the proof-of-concept
prototype and evaluate it.
A. Free Million(s) Facebook Likes
This attack aims to collect as many as Facebook Likes
we can from the distinct real users on a given Facebook
page. The number of Likes on the Facebook page not only
indicates how popular it is, but also acts as an important factor
affecting whether online advertising vendors post ads on the
page (owner of Facebook page will get paid) and pay for it.
According to [18], the real value of “Like” has been risen to
$174 in 2014 (from $136 in 2010). Buying friends through
social media is a common business practice which has been
reported in [19]. There exists several emerging Like-Promotion
companies (e.g., GetPaidforLikes.com or YouLikeCash.com),
which help owners of Facebook pages to increase the number
of Likes. Attackers can launch this attack to collect significant
Likes on his/her favorite Facebook pages or the advertisers’
pages.
For the advertising industry, the current business model
works as follows. First, Like-Promotion companies recruit
Facebook users to install their own Facebook applications
into participants’ Facebook accounts. Then the application will
automatically commit the Likes to the advertisers’ pages by
Like-Promotion companies’ instructions. Each participant will
earn around 1-5 cents per Like. The maximum number of
Likes they can offer to the advertisers rely on the number of
Facebook participants. Currently, there are 75K-460K users in
GetPaidforLikes.com and YouLikeCash.com, which represent
a business scale of $3,750-$23,000 per Facebook page (calcu-
lated based on the cost of 5-cents/Like the advertisers pay). If
attacker can manipulate 100 millions Facebook accounts based
on the attack model introduced in §IV and deliver their Likes to
specific Facebook page, the benefit in dollars will be 5 million
per page basis ($0.05×100 million Likes). The attackers can
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Figure 9. For anonymity, access Facebook by ToR-Browser. Note that we
do not use it in Netherlands.
run online Like-Promotion companies outside US (avoiding
trace-back via cash flow).
Different from using fake Facebook accounts. People may
think that we can achieve the same effects (ı.e, collect million
Facebook likes) by creating significant fake Facebook accounts
to like specific pages. Why should we use your approach?
Yours is even more complicated. This argument sounds rea-
sonable, however, the research community has been aware to
those issues and proposed many mechanisms [26], [43], [49],
[54] to detect fake accounts or spammers in social networks.
Differ from them, our attack model obtains free Facebook likes
through real Facebook accounts instead of fake ones. It brought
two benefits. First, the current detection mechanisms of fake
accounts are not designed for real user accounts. Second, the
advertisers are more willing to pay for likes if they come from
real users instead of fake ones.
B. Leak Million(s) Users’ Privacy
This attack aims to obtain the information about victims’
names, jobs, friends, family members, schools, photo, etc.,
through add-a-friend attack towards Facebook Text Service.
We first describe how it is operated since it slightly differs
from the previous Facebook Like attack, and then show how
attackers gain from it.
This attack works as follows. First, the adversaries
create several Facebook accounts with the fabricated per-
sonal information (e.g., use temporary email addresses,
http://10minutemail.com). Second, the attacker adds his/her
pre-created Facebook account to the victims’ friends by the
methodology introduced in §IV. Finally, Facebook sends a add-
a-friend notification to the adversary’s Facebook accounts and
requests for the approval. After approving this request, the
attacker becomes a friend of victim and see all information
(e.g., phone number, school, job, living area, contact list,
pictures, to name a few) that victim shares with his/her friends.
By this approach, the adversary can associate the mobile phone
number with victim’s real profile and sell those personal infor-
mation. Besides, to prevent Facebook from tracking attackers
while they access their Facebook accounts (i.e., approve add-
a-friend request), they can use ToR-Browser [16] to access
Facebook as shown in Figure 9 for anonymity purpose. Though
some researches challenge the anonymity of ToR networks.
However, their prerequisites are not easily satisfied in practice
(e.g., require NetFlow traces from the intermediate routers in
ToR [27]). We thus believe that ToR still provide the attackers
with the anonymity to a large extent in nowadays.
We next discuss another incentive model of this attack.
Celebrity Effects. The user privacy leakage itself might not
bring the instant benefits to the adversary at the first sight.
However, through the large-scale screening process above,
there exists a decent chance to discover some popular celebri-
ties on Facebook. If attackers successfully find some super-
stars, e.g., Cristiano Ronaldo (105M fans), Shakira (102M
fans), Vin Diesel (94M fans), Eminem (92M fans), Will Smith
(74M fans), the impact will be wide or even global. If we
quantify it in dollar, a recent report claims that Oscar-winner
Jared Leto garnered an astounding $13,000 for one sponsored
social media post (single post!!). The current number of fans of
Jared Leto on Facebook is 3.9M until August 2015. We believe
that security loopholes identified deserve more immediate
research efforts, since they indeed provide the attackers with
the sufficient incentive to launch attacks in practice.
C. Proof-of-Concept Attack
1) Design and Prototype: The design and implementation
of the two large-scale attacks are similar to the individual like-
a-page and add-a-friend attacks are introdiced in §IV-B, except
for two differences. First, for both of the million Facebook
likes and user privacy leakage attacks, we have to prepare the a
set of spoofable mobile phone numbers (candidate victims, OP-
I users) before launching attacks. The HackFacebook selects a
number from the victim candidate set, proceeds the individual
attack and repeat the procedure until all numbers are explored.
Second, since not all Facebook users will share their
mobile phone numbers with friends, we thus slightly revise
the add-a-friend attack as follows. After HackFacebook sends
the Facebook text message carries add-a-friend command to
32665 (FBOOK), it immediately sends another Facebook text
message to update the victim’s status by specifying his/her
mobile phone number (i.e., the originating address of Facebook
text messages being sent). After the adversary accepts the
victim’s add-a-friend request, the attacker can obtain victim’s
mobile phone number from his/her latest status update.
2) Evaluation: First, we need to clarify that our proof-
of-concept prototype does not aim to produce real world
damage but provide the feasibility studies. Thus, we here
mainly evaluate the capability of HackFacebook to send a
number of SMS messages at mobile device. To avoid legal
issue, we conduct the evaluation experiment as follow. We
use HackFacebook to deliver Facebook Text commands (i.e.,
for add-a-friend and like-a-page attacks) to ourselves. Once
the Facebook text command is received, we send another
Facebook text command to ourselves. Then we measure how
many SMS messages HackFacebook can transmit and receive
in 30 minutes. For performance comparison, we also conduct
the same experiment through the default messaging application
of Android. The results are plotted in Figure 10.
We have three findings. First, there is cap for the number
of SMS messages sent by Android messaging app within 30
minutes, says 30 messages. After the number of messages
being sent exceeds the threshold, Android OS keeps warning
users and hold the message deliver until user explicitly approve
it (press Allow button). We believe that it shall be Android’s
security mechanism (rate control) to protect users from the
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Figure 10. The number of messages are successfully sent and received in 30
minutes.
messages attacks launched by malware. Second, HackFace-
book can suppress the warning dialog, and deliver up to 2459
messages in 30 minutes in the experiment conducted before
April 2015. Third, we notice that the OP-I seems to deploy
a network-based rate control which limit the number of SMS
messages being sent in April 2015. However, HackFacebook
is still capable of delivering up to 1002 SMS messages in 30
minutes which is 33x time faster than Android. Though there
might exist some caps which we cannot discover in current
experiment settings, the adversaries can mitigate the limitations
by increasing the number of mobile devices infected to achieve
the same effects they need.
Short-lived impacts, no strong incentives for attackers?
Some people argue that impacts of two attacks are short-lived.
Once the victims discover that their Facebook accounts are
abused, they will cancel the Like, unfriend the attackers, and
report this issue to Facebook. Then the adversary gains nothing
from these attacks in the long term. We need to clarify that our
research does not aim propose the attack models for attackers
to live on. Instead, we focus on the feasibility study, and real-
world impacts analysis, and technical challenges to capture
real attackers. How to guide the attackers make a big profit by
them in a short time window (couple days or weeks) is not our
major concern in this work. Even there are several options for
them to make quick money (e.g., buy put option of Facebook
before attacks, win the bet (bet if I can make Well Smith to
add you as friend)).
D. Lessons Learnt
As what we learnt earlier, the phone-side security mecha-
nisms (e.g., text sending rate control) provided by OS is hard
to take the immediate actions as underlying networking tech-
nology evolves. A more open and device-network cooperation
security framework should be introduced to together defend
against new security threats while networking technology
changes. Moreover, we believe that carriers should share the
blame due to its loose regulation for text message delivery.
This issue can be exploited to launch the phone-based large-
scale text message attacks.
VI. STUDIES ON MORE MOBILE SERVICES
In this section, we conduct a medium-scale study on
the 64 mobile services from 27 distinct industries plotted in
Table I. By thoroughly analyzing their service models, use
scenarios, enrollment and runtime authentication mechanisms
and , we discover several security loopholes of them, which are
vulnerable to the security threats we presented in §IV and V.
We devise two large-scale attacks: (1) fulfill billion(s) dollar
donation attack and spam lawsuit attack to estimate the real
world impacts of those vulnerabilities. Finally, we summarize
the lesson learnt.
A. Service model, use scenarios, enrollment mechanisms and
runtime authentication
Service model and use scenarios. Among 64 mobile services,
there are two main service models: (1) request-response and
(2) notification/alerts subscription. The service model of the
former is that users first send the request text to mobile service
provider. The service server further process the request and
respond users with the results (it is optional, depends on the
mobile services). The former is usually adopted by mobile
banking, social networking, mobile giving (donate money
from phone), flight status query and etc. The latter is that
users subscribe the certain notifications (e.g., special offer,
flayer, news update, delivery status of goods, friends updates
their Facebook/Twitter) or alerts (credit cart payment due or
abnormal transactions).
Enrollment mechanisms. We observe the six enrolment
mechanisms summarized in Table II. One-Step allows users
to enroll the mobile service through website without user-
name and password (e.g., sign up phone number on
http://m.target.com/sms/baby/form to receive Target Baby’s
promotions) or SMS (e.g., text “JOIN” to 555444 to subscribe
Staple’s special offer and update). It is the most convenient and
popular way (23/64) to subscribe the mobile service. Two-Step
requires users to login the mobile service account on websites
and enter the mobile phone numbers on website. This approach
is not common (2/64) but adopted by two major US banks
including US Bank and Discover. Three-Step-Simple is similar
to One-Step. The main difference is that the after users enroll
the service, they will receive the confirmation text from the
service providers, and respond them with the fixed responses
(e.g, YES, Y) to complete the subscription. The simple and
fixed reply message is the main reason we call it as Three-
Step-Simple. The Four-Step-Simple and Four-Step-AuthCode
require users to login the mobile service on websites, enter
phone numbers, wait for the confirmation text messages. The
main difference is that the confirmation text message in Four-
Step-AuthCode will carry a authentication code. User has to fill
it in on the mobile service website, whereas, Four-Step-Simple
merely asks users to reply the fixed text messages (e.g., YES).
The advocates of the two approaches are mobile banking,
social networking and online payment service providers which
concerns user security and privacy more.
The last one is Always-On, it means that mobile users do
not need to subscribe the mobile services since carriers have
done it on behalf of users. Currently, we only observe it on
the mobile giving service which donate few money ($5-$10) to
some non-profit organizations, e.g., Red Cross or Food Bank.
Users don’t need to provide the charities with your checks,
credit card number or banking account information. Take Red
Cross as example, user just texts REDCROSS to 90999 to give
$10 to American Red Cross and his/her carrier will charge it
in the month bill or the balance of pre-paid card.
Runtime authentication. Last but not least, to our surprise,
after users finished mobile service subscription, up to 50
mobile services do not request for any runtime authentication
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Enrollment Method
Service Model
TotalRequest-Response Notification-Subscription
Web SMS Carrier Web SMS Carrier
One-Step 0 0 0 5 18 0 23
Two-Step 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Three-Step-Simple 0 0 0 5 9 0 14
Four-Step-Simple 2 0 0 1 0 0 3
Four-Step-AuthCode 6 0 0 0 0 0 6
Always On 0 0 14 0 0 0 14
Table II. SIX ENROLLMENT MECHANISMS FOR MOBILE SERVICES.
(i.e., ask users for passwords or secret codes before exe-
cuting the requests) while users access the mobile services.
For the notification-subscription mobile services, it might be
acceptable since it is a convenient way to users to receive
those notifications. However, for the request-response mobile
services, e.g., Facebook or Twitter, this approach can be
exploited to abuse their accounts as what we show in §IV
and V. Though the remaining 14 mobile services deploy the
runtime authentication, however, it cannot be considered the
strong one. It works as follows. On receipt of the request, the
mobile service server simply responds users with “Are you
sure to do XXX. If yes, please reply YES” as a simple runtime
authentication.
B. Security Loopholes
We discover two security loopholes from the design of
current mobile services.
Loose enrollment mechanisms of the notification-
subscription services. 37 of 38 the notification-subscription
services adopt the One-Step and Three-Step-Simple as their
subscription mechanisms. However, they cannot tell whether
the subscriptions are coming from the real users or attackers.
Our tool hackFacebook can be easily revised to subscribe those
notification services on behalf of the victims. For the services
using One-Step subscription approach, we directly texts the
subscription command to the mobile service provider. For the
ones using Three-Step-Simple, we first texts the subscription
command to the service provider, wait for 5 seconds, and texts
the pre-defined fixed reply message (e.g., YES, Y, GO) to the
provider. Note that the attacker is not required to receive the
confirmation text used in the Three-Step-Simple and finish the
service subscription.
Always-On service enrollment and weak runtime authenti-
cation used by a number of money-involvement services. To
encourage people to support the charities or non-profit organi-
zation, the most of carriers enroll the mobile giving services
on behalf of their customers. For example, there are forty
carriers (Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, etc) participating
in American Red Cross’s Text Message Donations program.
After the enrollment, their customers can easily donate money
to those non-profit organizations. However, is the security
mechanism of mobile giving services revised accordingly with
the evolution of mobile text services in 4G LTE networks?
Unfortunately, our studies conduct a negative answer. Most
charities only provide their donators with the weak runtime
authentication (i.e., To confirm your $10 donation to XXX rely
with YES or billing zipcode). For an attacker who can bypass
all security checks at mobile devices and carrier networks,
the always-on mobile giving service enrollment with a simple
runtime authentication mechanism can be exploited to launch
a financial attack in US.
C. Donation Attack
This attack aims to a small-scale financial disorder and
crisis. The adversary selects one representative charity supports
text messaging donation [6], and launch a large-scale donations
on behalf of victims. We revise the hackFacebook used in
large-scale attack. Use American Red Cross as example, it
works as follows. For each victim, it sends two text messages
to the 90999. The former is the text carries the donate code
(i.e., REDCROSS). The latter is the text with “YES” (the sim-
ple and fixed the donation confirmation text). The time interval
between the two texts is configured to 511 seconds. During the
waiting period, it can launch attack towards another victim
(i.e., conduct attack in pipeline). By this approach, for each
victim, the adversary can donate $10 on behalf of him/her. If
attackers launch a large-scale donation, it is projected to make
the financial crisis. The following customers’ complaining,
refunding, news report might cause a financial disorder and
small crisis in US.
D. Spam Lawsuit Attack
This attack is devised to launch attacks towards those
notification-subscription mobile service providers (e.g., Wal-
mart, HomeDepot, Macy, Costco, etc). Most companies target
on the end-consumer market usually allow customers to en-
roll their special offer, coupon, flyer or update and receive
them by text. Those companies are the final victims of this
attack. It works as follows. We subscribe those notification
services on behalf f victims by our tool since those mobile
service providers merely use One-Step and Three-Step-Simple
subscription mechanisms. Afterwards, those companies will
keep sending the promotion update texts to the victims. Those
texts will be considered as spam message. In US, every user
is well protected by CAN-SPAM (Controlling the Assault of
Non-Solicited Pornography And Marketing Act) and TCPA
(Telephone Consumer Protection Act) from the spamming
messages. The lawsuit for spam message is not rare in US.
For example, Papa John’s faced $250 million lawsuit over SMS
spam in 2012.
E. Lessons Learnt
There are two lessons learnt. First, for the notification-
subscription mobile services, they should pay more attention
to the subscription mechanisms. Otherwise, it will be a double-
edged sword. The more convenient it is, the more likely the
mobile service providers face the spam lawsuit. Second, for the
request-response mobile services, all non-query services (e.g.,
update status on Facebook, donate money, etc) should not be
offered without a solid runtime authentication mechanism. If
not, the mobile services are more likely to be abused by the
adversaries.
VII. REMEDIES
In this section, we propose defense measures to protect
the mobile service providers and mobile users as shown in
Figure 11. Our solution also seeks to be 3GPP/3GPP2 standard
and industry (short code service) compatible, thus facilitating
fast deployment.
11It is configurable. In our experiments, 95% text delivery is finished in
less 5 seconds.
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Figure 11. Overview of remedies to protect mobile services and users.
A. Fulfill Interactive Security Framework
We suggest a interactive security framework shall be de-
ployed between mobile device and mobile networks. From
§IV and §V, we observe that Google indeed does its best
to protect mobile users from malicious attacks (e.g., request
for approval when there exists a SMS message being sent
to specific phone number or warning dialog while a number
of SMS messages are about to be sent). We appreciate their
contributions to provide users with the secure SMS message
service. However, the phone-based approach might not be best
solution which can be easily bypast since they cannot always
take immediate actions in accordance with the change of the
underlying networking technology.
Thus, we propose an interactive security framework which
provides a generic request-for-user-approval mechanism. [41]
also propose similar idea, however, we try to make it more
generic for all use scenarios. It works as follows. While carrier
networks receives a special or attention needed request (e.g.,
send a SMS message to a premium-rate number or send a
number of SMS messages in a short time), it replies the
mobile user with a specific response code which requires user’s
approval. To be compatible with current mobile standards (all
network services are provided through SIP in 4G LTE), we
propose to add a new SIP response code, SIP 440 User
Approval Required. It carries the same content of SIP
401 Unauthorized [40] which requests for user authenti-
cation, but a specific SIP header specify the information (e.g.,
“Sending a message to 32665 will produce extra cost. Do you
agree with it?”) being displayed to user. The mobile device
treats the SIP 440 User Approval Required same as
SIP 401 Unauthorized, and calculate the answers to the
challenges. The only difference is that the mobile device only
replies it after the user approve it.
B. A Lightweight MAC-based Runtime Authentication
In recent years, both of academia and industry pro-
poses several SMS security frameworks (SMSSec [34], PK-
SIM [42], EasySMS [42]) or the end-to-end SMS encryp-
tion (Pushbullet [9]) to provide secure SMS communication
between individuals and mobile service providers. For the
infrastructure-based solutions, carriers need to modify current
network architecture to support it accordingly. For end-to-end
SMS encryption, it requires users to install the specific SMS
messaging applications for the message encryption and de-
cryption (e.g., Pushbullet). If so, why not use OTT messaging
applications (e.g, Whatsapp)? Is there any better way?
In fact, the message encryption which most prior researches
adopted is one of various methods to authenticate the message
delivered between mobile service providers and mobile users.
The most important thing for mobile service industry is to
guarantee the authenticity of each message received. We revisit
the current mobile service architecture in 4G LTE (Figure 2).
We find that there is almost no ways for mobile users to deliver
the spoofed SMS message (for 2G/3G users, it is forbidden
by mobile network standards; for 4G users, it can be easily
blocked at the core network). Besides, the delivery of SMS
message in cellular network is confidentially and integrally
protected. It implies that the delivery of SMS within carrier
networks is still considered secure to a large extent (we do not
consider that malicious carriers modify users’ SMS messages,
since it is not very common in practice).
Going down this direction, the possible attackers should
be the aggregators, content providers or their customers who
create spoofed SMS messages or modify the messages sent
from wireless carriers to launch the occasional attacks (other-
wise, they will be easily discovered and traced back). For those
small-scale attacks, we believe that the lightwight message
authentication code (MAC) mechanism with the symmetric
secret key shared by the mobile users and mobile service
providers can well defend against them. Though the MAC
takes 16-20 bytes (use cryptographic hash functions: MD5 or
SHA-1) from single SMS message (can carries 140 bytes data),
it occupies around the 14% space which is still considered
accepted for the better runtime authentication. To facilitate
the deployment, we suggest to implement it in the default
messaging application in Android. For the message which fail
to pass the verification of MAC, it shows a warning icon which
presents that it is a unauthenticated message or your mobile
service provider does not support runtime authentication.
Secret-based subscription mechanism To support MAC-
based runtime authentication, the prerequisite is to generate
the symmetric secret key between users and service providers.
It is not difficult for the mobile services which request for the
setup of user accounts prior to usage (e.g., mobile banking,
social networking, etc). The shared key can be the user’
password. For other mobile services (e.g., Walmart’s promo-
tion service), they do not ask users to create the accounts
during subscription for convenience. However, we believe that
they still can generate a easy-remember secret code (e.g.,
WXM889) or allow users to define their own secret codes
during the service subscription. Beside, to prevent the malware
from intercepting the secret code through text, we suggest
that it should not be exchanged through text but via websites
enable SSL/TLS secure connections. Afterwards, all messages
exchanged between mobile service providers and mobile users
are appended the corresponding MAC.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The mobile service security and privacy have been actively
studied in recent years. Diverse threats are identified from
mobile services, including permission bypass [37], [53], fraud-
ulent money transfer with online banking [36], [39], faked so-
cial network follower market [44]. The general vulnerabilities
include the coarse-grained Android permission control [23],
[32], [33], misuse of Android’s cryptographic APIs [29], [45],
account hijack [46], side-channel privacy leakage [28], etc..
To defend malware, both static analysis [30], [35], [51] and
policy-driven approach [50] are explored. Compared with these
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work, the vulnerabilities we discussed here are specific to the
mobile text service.
For the traditional circuit-switched and signaling based
text service, these early research efforts indeed help defend
threats of user privacy leakage in the message [38], faking the
message-based commands to the device [10], spamming the
voice with signaling-based message [31], [48], malware/virus
embedded in the message [24], [25], to name a few. In this
work, we demonstrate that with recent deployment of packet-
switched 4G LTE text service, these efforts are insufficient to
protect the mobile services.
IX. CONCLUSION
Mobile service over text messages is still one of the most
popular approaches by many service providers. By taking
advantage of readily deployed text service infrastructure, this
approach not only offers ubiquitous mobile services to all
mobile users, but also benefits from the built-in security
protections in cellular network. After years of operations and
evolutions in 2G/3G network, this approach is proven to be
effective in guaranteeing content integrity, origin authenticity
and accountability.
In this work, we show that these guarantees could be
violated in the 4G LTE context. The novel text service, as
well as security shields deemed effective for 2G/3G text ser-
vice, exposes new vulnerabilities in 4G networks. Large-scale
attacks can be launched in diverse mobile services, including
account-abuse, billion-dollar donation, spam lawsuit attacks, to
name a few. The causes of these vulnerabilities are diversified.
The mobile devices (OS) and mobile service providers do not
update their security functions in accordance with the carrier
infrastructure upgrade. For carriers, they indeed deploy new
security functions while the text service is turned from 2G/3G
CS into 4G PS domain. However, their incomplete security
functions and imprudent operations (i.e., disable TLS/IPSec)
further expose vulnerabilities to attackers. To defend against
these threats, we propose remedies that are readily deployable
and compatible with mobile network standards.
Three lessons can be summarized from these vulnerabilities
and attacks. First, phone-side security mechanisms cannot
accommodate the speedy and unpredictable the changes of
underlying networking technology. We believe that a general,
interactive device-network-cooperation based security frame-
work can offer more flexibilities and defense measures to users
and carriers to defend against the new attacks in the future.
Second, the mobile network standards (3GPP/3GPP2) should
not provide insecure communication options (e.g. disable
TLS/IPSec) to carriers. Such seemingly flexible configurations
may incur serve security concerns to not only the carrier
network, but also mobile services on top of it. Last but not
least, the runtime authentication is critical to guarantee per-
message integrity, authentic and accountability. Mobile service
providers should not expect to protect every content message
with one-time authentication at registration phase.
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APPENDIX
In Appendix, we introduce how to construct and submit a SIP
MESSAGE carries SMS message in OP-I.
A. Construct a SIP MESSAGE carries SMS message
To construct it, we need to prepare two parts: message headers
and message body. In the following, we describe how to construct
each of them on the mobile device.
Message headers Figure 12 illustrates the headers of a SIP
MESSAGE contains an SMS message. We summarize that the eight
header fields shall be filled accordingly by mobile device’s realtime
profile: Request-Line (Line 1, recipient’s phone number), Route (Line
3, IMS server address), Via (Line 4, sender’s IP address), From (Line
6, sender’s phone number), To (Line 7, recipient’s phone number), P-
Preferred-Identify (Line 9, sender’s phone number), Call-ID (Line 14,
sender’s IP address), Content-Length (Line 15, the size of the message
body). For other headers, their values will not affect whether the SIP
MESSAGE is accepted or rejected (ı.e., we can apply same values to
different mobile devices).
The most important step to construct message headers is to
obtain the IP address of the IMS server since it is not static and
open to public. We retrieve it from the routing table by executing
a Linux command “ip -6 route”. Note that this command does not
require root privilege. On all of our test phones, there exist two
network interfaces: rmnet0 and rmnet1 for the packets of the
Internet data service and the IMS services (e.g., SMS delivery or
VoLTE (Voice over LTE, akin to VoIP)), respectively. The IMS server
shall be associated with the network interface reserved for IMS
services. However, we found that the IMS network interface may
be rmnet0 or rmnet1 in different phone models, we thus need
to differentiate these two. We find that carriers alway associate the
“Default” routing rule with the network interface assigned to Internet
data service (e.g., default via fe80:xxx::5dc8 dev rmnet0 metric
1024). Thus, we infer which network interface is reserved for the
IMS services and obtain the IMS server address from its routing rule
(e.g., “2001:xxxx:y:fe03:fa:104:0:5 via ... dev rmnet1”).
Message body Figure 13 presents a CDMA SMS message [22]
(for 3GPP2 carriers). There are two fields being filled accordingly:
destination address and user data (the content of SMS). Android OS
provides a set of classes (e.g., CdmaSmsAddress, BearerData) in the
library, ITelephony [3] to construct the message.
B. Send a SIP MESSAGE carries SMS message
We analyze the SIP signaling exchange between mobile devices
and IMS servers, and observe a fixed communication pattern. All
IMS servers are waiting for SIP MESSAGE signallings from mobile
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Figure 13. Message body of SIP MESSAGE carries a SMS being sent.
devices by listening to the UDP port number 5060. Besides, we
notice that there is no strong binding between the SIP session and the
underlying transport layer. Specifically, IMS servers will process SIP
MESSAGE signallings from the mobile devices regardless of what the
UDP source port numbers they uses during the user authentication.
We next simply opens a UDP socket, specify the destination address
and port number to be IMS server address and 5060, respectively,
and send the SIP MESSAGE out.
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